European Central Bank
The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank of the European Union countries which have adopted the euro. Our main task is to maintain price stability in the euro area and so preserve the purchasing power of the single currency.
Are restrictions on fiscal policy necessary for monetary policy to be able to deliver price stability? When households are Ricardian, the net present value of future fiscal surpluses needs to equate the real value of government debt absent inflation. We show that when households are not Ricardian, fiscal requirements still exist but take the very different form of a limit on the debt-to-GDP ratio. The debt-to-GDP limit captures the idea that public debt cannot be so large that the wealth effect of public debt on aggregate spending can no longer be counter-balanced by interest rate hikes, however large. To implement price stability when the debt-to-GDP requirement is satisfied, monetary policy must respond to the level of public debt, not just to the inflation it creates.
During his reign from 1979 to 2005, Pope John Paul II visited 129 countries, more than the 263 Popes before him combined. I document a significant increase in exports to trading partners with a relatively high share of Catholics following a Pastoral visit, leading to a non-negligible increase in aggregate exports. The biggest beneficiaries in terms of increased trade are visited countries that are at lower stages of economic development and have relatively few Catholics and weak trade links. The effect is absent for other prominent episodes, such as global sports events or visits by political dignitaries.
Physical climate risks can have a large regional impact, which can influence mortgage loans’ credit risk and should be priced by the lenders. Motivated by the relevance of climate change for financial intermediaries, our paper aims at analysing if physical climate risks are being reflected in residential real estate loan rates of banks. We show that on average banks seem to demand a physical climate risk premium from mortgage borrowers and the premium has increased over recent years. However, there is significant heterogeneity in bank practices. Banks that were identified as “adequately” considering climate risk in the credit risk management by the ECB Banking Supervision charge higher risk premia which have been increasing particularly after the publication of supervisory expectations. In contrast, the lack of risk premia of certain banks shows that ECB diagnostics in the Thematic Review on Climate were accurate in identifying the banks that need stronger supervisory focus.
We field a series of experiments in a population-representative survey of European consumers to examine their attitudes towards the possible introduction of a digital euro. First, we show that a short video explaining the key features of the digital euro is effective in changing consumers’ beliefs about such a new form of payment and increases the likelihood of adoption by 12pp relative to a control group that is not shown the video. Second, we find that on aggregate consumers would allocate a relatively small fraction from a positive wealth shock to digital euros and their allocation to other liquid assets would be little affected. Third, holding limits in the range of €1,000 to €10,000 have insignificant differential effects on the composition of liquid asset holdings. We also show that a non-trivial fraction of consumers report that they will not adopt the digital euro due to strong preferences for existing forms of payment.
Large-scale debt forbearance is a key policy tool during crises, yet targeting is challenging due to information asymmetries. Using transaction-level data from a Portuguese bank during COVID-19, we find that financially fragile households are more likely to enter forbearance, irrespective of income shocks. Mortgage payment suspension increases consumption and savings, but effects differ across households. Low liquid wealth and income are associated with a higher marginal propensity to consume. Additionally, ineligible households accessing forbearance show a higher propensity to consume than eligible ones. Our results suggest that observable household characteristics can help in the design of effective debt relief policies.
Questions about market power have become salient in macroeconomics. We consider the role of institutional structures in addressing these within a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Standard models account for monopoly profits as a lump-sum transfer to the representative agent. We label this an "incentive leakage," and show this to be a general characteristic of firm-optimal arrangements. We show that shareholder-operated or worker-operated firms that eliminate leakage can generate within-firm incentives that effectively reduce monopoly distortion in equilibrium. When all firms operate similarly, an additional general equilibrium effect arises through internalization of an aggregate demand externality. We characterize steady-state welfare across structures, and show how zero-leakage institutions lead to improvements towards the Golden Rule benchmark. Overall, our paper takes the first step towards an analysis of the macroeconomics of institutions without incentive leakage.
We construct a New-Keynesian E-DSGE model with energy disaggregation and financial intermediaries to show how energy-related fiscal and macroprudential policies interact in affecting the euro area macroeconomy and carbon emissions. When a shock to the price of fossil resources propagates through the energy and banking sector, it leads to a surge in inflation while lowering output and carbon emissions, absent policy interventions. By contrast, imposing energy production subsidies reduces both CPI and core inflation and increases aggregate output, while energy consumption subsidies only lower CPI inflation and reduce aggregate output. Carbon subsidies instead produce an intermediate effect. Given that both energy subsidies raise carbon emissions and delay the “green transition,” accompanying them with parallel macroprudential policy that taxes dirty energy assets in bank portfolios promotes “green” investment while enabling energy subsidies to effectively mitigate the adverse effects of supply-type shocks, witnessed in recent years in the EA.
This paper explores the impact of bank transparency on market efficiency by comparing banks that disclose supervisory capital requirements to those that remain opaque. Due to the informational content of supervisory capital requirements for the market this opacity might hinder market efficiency. The paper estimates an average 11.5% reduction in funding costs for transparent versus opaque banks. However, there is some heterogeneity in those effects. Transparency helps the market to sort across safer and riskier banks. Conditional on disclosure, the safest quartile of banks, those with a CET1 P2R lower than 1.5% of risk-weighted assets, benefits in average from 31.1% lower funding costs. The paper concludes that supervisory transparency is beneficial, supporting the view that supervisory transparency enhances market discipline by allowing markets to better evaluate and price the risk associated with each bank.
Does it pay to invest in green companies? In countries where a market for carbon is functioning, such as those within the European Union, our findings suggest that it should be beneficial. Using a sample of green and brown European firms, we initially demonstrate that green companies have outperformed brown ones in recent times. Subsequently, we develop a production economy model in which brown firms acquire permits to emit carbon into the atmosphere. We find that the presence of a well-functioning carbon market could account for the green equity premium observed in our data. Incorporating a preference for green financial assets is also unlikely to overturn our results.
We document that compared to all other investor groups investment funds exhibit a distinctly procyclical behavior when financial-market beliefs about the probability of a euro-related, institutional rare disaster spike. In response to such euro disaster risk shocks, investment funds shed periphery but do not adjust core sovereign debt holdings. The periphery debt shed by investment funds is picked up by investors domiciled in the issuing country, namely banks in the short term and insurance corporations and households in the medium term.
We document that inflation risk in the U.S. varies significantly over time and is often asymmetric. To analyze the macroeconomic effects of these asymmetric risks within a tractable framework, we construct the beliefs representation of a general equilibrium model with skewed distribution of markup shocks. Optimal policy requires shifting agents’ expectations counter to the direction of inflation risks. We perform counterfactual analyses using a quantitative general equilibrium model to evaluate the implications of incorporating real-time estimates of the balance of inflation risks into monetary policy communications and decisions.
Climate change is a global-scale structural change, affecting economies across the world, alongside global fragmentation, digitalisation and demographics. This paper analyses the diffusion of climate policies and technologies and the role of institutions and governance in that process. It discusses theory, models and data available to date, and the empirical evidence for the 20 European Union and all 40 countries covered by the OECD’s Environmental Policy Stringency index. The results indicate that institutions and governance have significant effects towards a greater speed and spread of diffusion of climate policies and technologies, and that separating the speed and spread effects is essential for assessing the green transition.
Institutional investors, such as investment funds, are playing an increasingly important role in residential real estate markets. This raises the possibility that their actions might drive aggregate market outcomes and may change how and which macrofinancial shocks transmit to house prices. In a Bayesian vector autoregression setting, we show that a demand shock from institutional investors has a positive and persistent effect on aggregate euro area house price growth and mortgage lending volumes. Institutional investors also increase their purchase activity following a loosening of monetary policy. Exploiting regional heterogeneity in eight euro area countries, we show in a panel regression setting that institutional investors weaken the link between house price growth and local economic fundamentals, but strengthen the sensitivity to monetary policy and financial market developments.
Using supervisory data of alternative investment funds investing in bonds, I exploit the COVID-19 crisis to examine the effectiveness of redemption restrictions from a financial stability perspective. First, I find that redemption restrictions reduced outflows during the March 2020 market turmoil but did not result in higher outflows in the periods following the crisis episode. Second, I find that funds with higher redemption restrictions engaged less in procyclical cash hoarding during the COVID-19 crisis period, even after controlling for the size of their outflows. Third, I find that redemption restrictions do not have a significant impact on the sensitivity of investor inflows to good performance, but they significantly reduce the sensitivity of outflows to bad performance. These findings suggest that redemption restrictions can mitigate fragility in open-ended investment funds.
We study the heterogeneous pass-through of monetary policy across firms with different labor shares. The goal is to obtain evidence on a labor-intensity transmission channel that should in fact be operating for other kinds of demand shocks as well. Our basic idea is that labor is special: unlike capital, it cannot be pledged against loans as collateral due to property rights. Based on a sample of over one million European firms, we document substantial heterogeneity in terms of firms’ investment response: when conditions tighten, fixed capital stock of labor-intensive firms decreases relative to capital-intensive production. These findings cannot be explained by other proxies for financial constraints such as age, size or financial leverage. Our results suggest that the impact of monetary policy is driven by borrowing constraints of high labor share firms, and that monetary policy is more potent in an economy characterized by a high labor share.
Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8, Ireland, Slovenia, and Spain set up public Asset Management Companies (AMCs), purchasing delinquent loans equal to 44%, 16%, and 10% of GDP, respectively. Though deemed successful, it’s unclear if this was de facto traditional capital and liquidity support. We show that AMCs have a systematic advantage in reducing pecuniary externalities and costs associated with loan delinquencies. AMCs enhance average returns to bank lending, promoting additional lending (bank lending channel) and improving corporate borrowers’ balance sheets (balance sheet channel). The welfare gains of well-designed and well-managed AMCs are between 0.2% and 0.5% of steady-state consumption, independent of whether they are financed through fiscal transfers or sterilized monetary transfers; AMCs can complement traditional fiscal and monetary policies in managing financial crises.
The digitalisation of payments has accelerated over the last decades with the internet and ever faster and cheaper computing. Now, many believe that decentralised finance (“DeFi”) offers fundamentally new possibilities for trading, payments and settlement. Moreover, for a few years central banks have launched work on what has been called retail and wholesale central bank digital currencies (“CBDC”). Concurrent to the rise of innovative technologies has been the advent of new terminology, which is widely used, but which often seems to be biased, confusing, or is used inconsistently. By providing an etymology of key concepts and reviewing terminology and definitions, this paper also provides a new approach to clarifying the essence of new technologies in the field of payments to facilitate ongoing discussions about their eventual merits and use cases.
Homeownership rates and holdings of housing wealth differ immensely across countries. Using micro data from five economies, we estimate a life-cycle model with illiquid housing in which households face a discrete–continuous choice between renting and owning a house. We use the model to decompose the cross-country differences in the homeownership rate and the value of housing wealth into three groups of explanatory factors: house price expectations, the institutional set-up of the housing market and preferences. We find that all three groups of factors matter, although preferences less so. Differences in homeownership rates are strongly affected by (i) house price beliefs and (ii) the rental wedge, the difference between rents and housing maintenance costs, which reflects the quality of the rental market. Differences in the value of housing wealth are substantially driven by maintenance costs.
An increase of e100 per tonne in the EU carbon price reduces the carbon footprint but lowers GDP due to higher energy costs and carbon leakage. Using a dynamic multi-sector, multi-country model augmented with an energy block that includes endogenous renewable energy investment, we analyze the macroeconomic and emissions effects of a carbon price. Investment in renewable energy mitigates electricity price increases in the medium term, leading to a smaller GDP loss (up to -0.4%) and a larger emissions reduction (24%) in the EU. Neglecting renewable energy investment overestimates the negative economic impact. We also find that a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) reduces carbon leakage but slightly hurts GDP and inflation as the competitive gain is offset by the higher costs of imported intermediate inputs.
This paper investigates the role of banking networks in the transmission of shocks across borders. Combining banking deregulation in the US with state-level idiosyncratic demand shocks, we show that geographically diversified banks reallocate funds from economies experiencing negative shocks to unaffected regions. Our findings indicate that in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, financial integration reduces business cycle comovement and synchronizes consumption patterns. Our findings contribute to explaining the Great Moderation and provide empirical support for theories that predict that banking integration facilitates the insurance of region-specific risk and the efficient allocation of resources as markets become more complete.
Housing expenditure shares decline with income. A household’s income determines its sensitivity to housing costs and drives its location decision. Has spatial skill sorting increased because low income individuals are avoiding increasingly expensive regions? I augment a standard quantitative spatial model with flexible non-homothetic preferences to estimate the effect of the national increase in the relative supply of high skilled workers that has put upward pressure on housing costs in skill-intensive cities. My model explains 10% of the increase in average house prices in Germany from 2007 to 2017 and 11% of the regional differences in house price increases. One third of the effects is due to an increase in spatial skill sorting driven by differences in housing expenditure shares. The observed degree of skill sorting was not significantly different from the optimal allocation in 2007 while skill sorting was larger than optimal in 2017.
We study the implications of deviations from covered interest rate parity for international capital flows using novel data covering euro-area derivatives and securities holdings. Consistent with a dynamic model of currency risk hedging, we document that investors’ holdings of USD bonds decrease following a widening in the USD-EUR cross-currency basis (CCB). This effect is driven by investors with larger FX rollover risk and hedging mandates, and it is robust to instrumenting the CCB. These shifts in bond demand significantly affect bond prices. Our findings shed light on a new determinant of international capital flows with important consequences for financial stability.
This paper explores the impact of the regulatory leverage ratio (LR) on banks’ demand for reserves and thus the pricing of overnight liquidity in the euro area money markets. We use daily transaction-level money market data during the period between January 2017 - February 2023 and examine the two major overnight money market segments – the unsecured and the secured one, distinguishing between over-the-counter (OTC) and CCP-cleared trades for the latter. We find a significant positive link between a bank’s LR and the spread between its money market borrowing rate and the DFR. Banks with a higher LR offer deposits at higher interest rates, thereby reducing the markdown vis-à-vis the DFR. The impact of the LR dampens during the period in which central bank reserves did not count towards the LR exposure measure (or the denominator of the ratio). It is stronger for G-SIBs, who need to comply with a G-SIB LR add-on on top of the minimum requirement applicable to all euro area banks. Moreover, the impact is weaker for CCP-cleared transactions compared to OTC trades, likely reflecting the possibility to net bilateral exposures if cleared via CCPs, which effectively allows banks to finance the respective gross money market exposures with a smaller share of Tier 1 capital.
This paper examines the great supply shock following the pandemic and the invasion of Ukraine, using a novel suite of supply indices. The suite has indices for the euro area total economy, euro area industries, sectors and countries. The suite also computes the contributions to the indices from supply drivers at origin, in transport, or at destination. The results from the suite show that the supply shock has had wide-spread effects, and that their dynamics have been industry-, sector- and country-specific. Supply conditions have been tighter for longer in the euro area than other areas, in automobile than digital and food industries, in services relative to other sectors, and in some countries than others. The drivers at home appear to account for an increasing share of the specificity at the end of the sample, and a broader data set helps to better capture these drivers. The results also confirm that the supply indices in the suite lag supply shocks and lead variables susceptible to the effects of supply shocks.
This paper investigates the growth impact of the EU’s Structural, Cohesion and Pre-accession Funds. We look at a large sample of 27 EU countries and the UK, over a period of 1989 and 2020, essentially covering the full history of these funds. We show that the growth effect of the funds is conditional on institutional quality: the funds contribute to economic growth only in countries with strong institutions: low corruption, strong rule of law, effective governments, and strong regulatory quality.Our research have important messages for the expected economic impact of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). On the one hand, our findings highlight the risk that countries with weaker institutions – that also receive more funds - may use such funds less efficiently or wisely. On the other hand, countries that receive more RRF funds are also expected to introduce more structural reforms, some of which have the potential to improve institutional quality and thereby improve the effectiveness of the RRF and EU funds in general.
Flexibility has progressively become a distinctive feature of the implementation of the Eurosystem’s asset purchases. In its many manifestations, flexibility has also been used by asset managers in the daily selection of sovereign bonds to limit the impact of asset purchases on repo market specialness. This study shows that, since the inception of the Public Sector Purchase Programme, flexible purchases of bonds greatly mitigated the Eurosystem’s footprint on the repo market.
Inflation risk premiums tend to be positive in an economy mainly hit by supply shocks, and negative if demand shocks dominate. Risk premiums also fluctuate with risk aversion. We shed light on this nexus in a linear-quadratic equilibrium microfinance model featuring time variation in inflation-consumption correlation and risk aversion. We obtain analytical solutions for real and nominal yield curves and for risk premiums. While changes in the inflation-consumption correlation drive nominal yields, changes in risk aversion drive real yields and act as amplifier on nominal yields. Combining a trend-cycle specification of real consumption with hysteresis effects generates an upward-sloping real yield curve. Estimating the model on US data from 1961 to 2019 confirms substantial time variation in inflation risk premiums: distinctly positive in the earlier part of our sample, especially during the 1980s, and turning negative with the onset of the new millennium.
Climate-linked bonds, issued by governments and supranational organizations, are pivotal in advancing towards a net-zero economy. These bonds adjust their payoffs based on climate variables such as average temperature and greenhouse gas emissions, providing investors a hedge against long-term climate risks. They also signal government commitment to climate action and incentivize stronger policies. The price differential between climate-linked bonds and nominal bonds reflects market expectations of climate risks. This paper introduces a model of climate risk hedging and estimates that approximately three percent of government debt in major economies could be converted into climate-linked bonds.
Exploiting the recalibration of ECB’s outstanding central bank funding in 2022, we show that a sharp reabsorption of bank liquidity induces a tightening impact on credit supply, as intended when centralbanks reduce their balance sheets. The tightening originates from the sudden relative convenience for banks accustomed to large liquidity holdings to more rapidly adapt to the new environment. Moreover, we show that the associated reduction in credit supply has real economic effects.
Banks are reluctant to tap central bank backup liquidity facilities and use the borrowed funds for loans to the real economy. We show that excessively parsimonious borrowing and lending can arise in a stigma-free model where the banking sector has an incentive to overissue deposits. Banks don’t heed the central bank’s call for more credit to finance investment because they simply ignore the collective gains from stronger activity in their atomistic decisions. Central banks can address this market failure by disintermediating market-based finance. A lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) system in which the central bank offers liquidity liberally but on non-concessionary conditions improves over a pure laissez-faire arrangement, where asset liquidation in the marketplace is the only source of emergency liquidity. But under LOLR banks remain reluctant to intermediate. Credit easing (CE) and quantitative easing (QE), instead, can stimulate bank borrowing and repair the broken nexus between liquidity provision and credit. Empirical analysis using bank-level and loan-by-loan data supports our model predictions. We find no empirical connection between loans and borrowed reserves obtained from conventional refinancing facilities. In contrast, there is a robust connection between loans and structural sources of liquidity: reserves borrowed under a CE program or non-borrowed, i.e. acquired from a QE injection. We also find that firms with greater exposure to banks borrowing in a CE program or holding larger volumes of non-borrowed reserves increase employment, sales, and investment.
To what extent can private firms’ external equity substitute for debt financing in a banking crisis? To answer this question, I use firm-level data and firm-bank linkages to estimate the causal effect of an imported lending cut from a large German bank on firms’ capital structure and real outcomes. The estimates imply that for every 1 euro reduction in debt, private firms in Germany received 0.27 euros of external equity. Firm-owner linkages indicate that outsiders provided equity funds in 40% of the firms that received an equity injection, while existing owners provided the funds in the rest. These findings highlight the importance of multiple sources of financing that can serve as backup facilities when the primary source of intermediation fails. The results also have implications for Macro-Finance heterogeneous firm models that typically overlook the role of equity financing.
We assess Euro Area financial integration correcting for the role of “onshore offshore financial centers” (OOFCs) within the Euro Area. The OOFCs of Luxembourg, Ireland, and the Netherlands serve dual roles as both hubs of investment fund intermediation and centers of securities issuance by foreign firms. We provide new estimates of Euro Area countries’ bilateral portfolio investments which look through both roles, attributing the wealth held via investment funds to the underlying holders and linking securities issuance to the ultimate parent firms. Our new estimates show that the Euro Area is less financially integrated than it appears, both within the currency union and vis-à-vis the rest of the world. While official data suggests a sharp decline in portfolio home bias for Euro Area countries relative to other developed economies following the introduction of the euro, we demonstrate that this pattern only remains true for bond portfolios, while it is artificially generated by OOFC activities for equity portfolios. Further, using new administrative evidence on the identity of non-Euro Area investors in OOFC funds, we document that the bulk of the positions constituting missing wealth in international financial accounts are now accounted for by United Kingdom counterparts.
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